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Abstract: The current study yielded a number of important findings. We 
managed to build a neural network that achieved an accuracy score of 91 
per cent in classifying troll and genuine tweets. By means of regression 
analysis, we identified a number of features that make a tweet more 
susceptible to correct labelling and found that they are inherently present 
in troll tweets as a special type of discourse. We hypothesised that those 
features are grounded in the sociolinguistic limitations of troll writing, 
which can be best described as a combination of two factors: speaking 
with a purpose and trying to mask the purpose of speaking. Next, we 
contended that the orthogonal nature of these factors must necessarily 
result in the skewed distribution of many different language parameters 
of troll messages. Having chosen as an example distribution of the topics 
and vocabulary associated with those topics, we showed some very 
pronounced distributional anomalies, thus confirming our prediction. 
TROLLJÄGER: 
UNDERSTANDING TROLL WRITING AS A LINGUISTIC PHENOMENON 
Introduction 
In February 2018, the U.S. Justice Department indicted 13 Russian nationals associated with the 
Internet Research Agency (IRA), based in St. Petersburg, for interfering with the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election (Barrett, Horwitz, & Helderman, 2018). Those individuals were accused of 
creating false U.S. personas and operating social media pages and groups designed to attract U.S. 
audiences and to sow discord in the U.S. political system, which included posting derogatory 
information about a number of candidates, supporting the presidential campaign of then-candidate 
Donald J. Trump and disparaging Hillary Clinton. 
The aftereffects of those events were tremendous: they almost led to the impeachment of 
the newly elected U.S. president, severely damaged the Russian economy due to the imposed U.S. 
sanctions, and almost ruined relations between the world’s two superpowers. Much more than that, 
those events revealed and epitomised the ongoing change in modern internet communication, 
having given prominence to such concepts as ‘fake news’, ‘alternative facts', and even ‘post-truth’. 
Taking into account the global scale of this scandal and its ever-widening ramifications for 
human society, one can only wonder why the phenomenon of troll writing has not received, to date, 
any substantial scientific attention. We do not mean that Russian trolls’ tweets were not collected 
and analysed; they were, as were many other such tweets before them. The problem is that they, to 
the best of our knowledge, were not viewed as a language phenomenon in its own right. 
An array of tweet parameters have come under scrutiny: dates of publication, rates of 
accounts’ creation and deletion, language, geographical location, percentage of tweets including 
images and videos, hashtags, mentions, and URLs; however, hardly any work has been done that 
could help to explain the discourse-specific features of this type of writing (see Zannettou et al. 
2019 for the most recent and comprehensive review). In addition, in the very rare instances of 
research that has been conducted in the desired direction of content analysis, the findings have been 
regrettably trivial. For example, in the aforementioned paper, Zannettou et al. discovered that 
Russian trolls tend to 1) post longer tweets, 2) be more negative and subjective, and 3) refer to more 
general topics than random Twitter users. Similarly unaspiring from a linguistic perspective are the 
results of some other recent studies of state-sponsored and inauthentic internet messages (Egele et 
al. 2017; Elyashar et al. 2017; Volkova & Bell 2016). 
The current study aims to fill or rather embark upon filling this gap by addressing the issue 
on systematic footing, starting from a simple classification task and then diving deeper into 
analysing the particular language traits of trolls’ tweets as opposed to the tweets that we for the lack 
of better term will refer to as ‘genuine’. The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the 
first section, we describe the process of designing several neural networks that are capable of 
identifying tweets written by trolls, and we present the obtained results. In the second section, the 
question of what distinguishes correctly and incorrectly labelled tweets is answered by building a 
logistic regression model and interpreting its main effects and interactions. In the third section, we 
resort to topic modelling and analysis of word distribution in trolls’ tweets to obtain insights into 
which parameters characterise troll writing as a linguistic phenomenon. The conclusion synthesises 
the findings and outlines perspectives for further research.

What a neural network can predict 
Back in November 2017 and in June 2018, the U.S. House Intelligence Committee consecutively 
released two lists of Twitter handles that had been connected with IRA activity (Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, 2018), amounting to 3,841 handles in total. On July 25, 2018, Clemson 
University researchers Darren Linvill, an associate professor of communication, and Patrick 
Warren, an associate professor of economics, collected every tweet sent from 2,848 of those handles 
between February 2012 and May 2018, with the vast majority posted from 2015 through 2017 
(Linvill & Warren 2018). Linvill and Warren made their dataset, 13 CSV files including 2,973,371 
tweets, publicly available on Github, from where we downloaded it.  1
Choosing a dataset that could be compared with troll tweets turned out not to be a trivial 
task because a number of assumptions had to be met. First, the overall number of tweets in the 
second set must be of comparable size to that of a troll’s collection of tweets, and such a huge 
archive is not easy to find. Second, the span of time over which the tweets in the second set were 
posted must also be somewhere between 2015 and 2017 or near it. Thirdly, the distribution of topics 
in the second set must be as close as possible to that of trolls’ tweets: politics, economy, elections, 
latest home and foreign affairs. Fourthly, the authenticity of the Twitter accounts in the second set 
must be beyond any doubt, and they should be as ‘un-troll-like’ as possible. Finally, and probably 
most importantly, the tweets of the second subset must be written, as should the trolls’ tweets, by a 
relatively compact group of people allegedly sharing some professional or ideological common 
ground. 
After long consideration we decided upon Tweets of Congress, a collection of daily tweets 
of both houses of the U.S. Congress, encompassing more than 1,000 campaign, office, committee 
and party accounts. From this dataset, posted by Alex Litel on Github under permissive MIT 
License, we obtained 1,468,114 tweets written between June 2017 and June 2019. Given the 
abundance of requirements, this choice seems to be a reasonable compromise. 
The initial stage of work involved data cleaning and preprocessing. From the downloaded 
archives, we retrieved only the tweets themselves, leaving out all other details such as the author’s 
ID, nickname, date and place of publication, and the number of retweets and comments. 
There was an issue with the language of tweets that needed to be addressed: both 
collections included tweets written in languages other than English. While the trolls’ tweets were 
marked for language, and it was easy to filter relevant messages, the congressmen’s tweets 
contained no such information. Given the size of the collection, we had to resort to automatic 
language identification. We used the langid tool for Python, which has been reported to have better 
accuracy of identification of microblog messages’ language than any of the other systems tested 
(Lui & Baldwin 2012: 29). The overall classification results were unsatisfactory in our case; 
however, the problem was solved by filtering out from the tweets classified as not English only 
those tweets with a confidence score (unnormalised log-probability) of less than 200. In total, 5,054 
congressmen’s tweets were marked as not written in English and consequently deleted. 
We used a preprocessor tool that was specially designed for tweet data to remove all 
unnecessary elements, such as URLs; hashtags; mentions; reserved words (RT, FAV); emojis; and 
smileys. Punctuation signs and digits were also removed. Then, all tweets were tokenised and 
lemmatised with the help of a WordNetLemmatizer tool based on WordNet lexical database 
(Fellbaum 1998). After that, the so-called stop words were deleted: all forms of pronouns, 
auxiliaries and contractions, articles and demonstratives, conjunctions and prepositions. Finally, 
 The data, models, Python and R codes are available at: 1
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/race05ofob7ga7s/AAAuaBe8Y4p43ViOXdSrRweXa?dl=0
both collections were checked for duplicate tweets, and all tweets with less than 2 words were 
disposed of. 
After preprocessing, there remained 1,361,708 trolls’ tweets and 1,223,340 congressmen’s 
tweets in our two collections. 
For the sake of illustration, this is how one of the trolls’ tweets looked before 
preprocessing: 
[‘Hillary Clinton barks like a dog to make a point about the GOP https://t.co/lnTm0is1VX с помощью 
@YouTube’] 
and this is how it looked after: 
[‘hillary', ‘clinton', ‘bark', ‘like', ‘dog', ‘make', ‘point', 'gop'] 
The next step was preparation of the data for feeding into the neural network, which was chosen as 
one of the most powerful and up-to-date text classification techniques, surpassing in many respects 
other non-parametric supervised learning algorithms such as support vector machine (SVM), 
decision tree, rule induction, and k-nearest neighbours (kNN) (Thangaraj & Sivakami 2018). First, 
as we did not have enough computational power to work with the whole joint collection of more 
than 2,500,000 tweets, we randomly selected a sample of 300,000 messages, having previously 
added 0 at the end of each troll’s tweet and 1 at the end of each congressman’s tweet—as class 
labels. The trolls were represented in the sample by 158,564 whereas the congressmen were 
represented by 141,436 tweets. 
After that, all 0s and 1s were removed from the messages and combined into a test vector 
in the same order as they had been placed in the sample. Next, the test vector was converted into a 
two-dimensional Numpy array to serve as a reference tool for the neural network so that each 0 
became [1, 0], and each 1 became [0, 1]. 
Since neural networks cannot work with strings of text but only with numbers, all tweets 
had to be encoded. Vectorising was performed with the help of the Tokenizer preprocessing tool 
(Chollet 2015): each lemma in the sample was assigned a unique index, and then each tweet was 
turned into a sequence of integers, each integer being the index of a lemma in the dictionary. 
All input vectors fed into a neural network must be of the same length; therefore, all 
encoded tweets were padded to the same length: the length of the longest message in our sample (73 
words). Every tweet shorter than that was padded by adding the sufficient number of 0s at the end. 
Finally, the encoded tweets were split into two random subsets: one of 240,000 messages 
for training a neural network and another of 60,000 messages for testing the accuracy of 
classification (Pedregosa et al. 2011). 
For our classification purposes, we compared two neural networks: the simplest 
feedforward sequential model, that is, in essence, just a linear stack of layers, and a much more 
advanced bidirectional long short term memory model (BLSTM) that duplicates the first recurrent 
layer in the network and then provides the first layer with the input sequence ‘as is’ and the second 
layer with the reversed copy of the input (Gers et al. 2002; Baldi et. al. 2001; Hochreiter & 
Schmidhuber 1997; Schuster & Paliwal 1997). As it had been reported that BLSTMs are the fastest 
and most accurate among other recurrent neural networks (Graves & Schmidhuber 2005), we 
propose that our second model should outperform the first one.

The configuration of two neural networks is presented in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. The 
sequential model includes the following: 1) one embedding layer that turns the word indexes of 
each tweet into dense vectors of a fixed size (73 is the number of words in the longest tweet, 100 is 
the number of neurones in each layer of the network); 2) two hidden fully connected layers; and 
3) an output layer with two possible outcomes: 0 or 1. In the BLSTM model, the embedded and 
output layers are the same; however, instead of two hidden layers, it includes the following: 1) a 
bidirectional layer (that is, two duplicated layers for the proper and reversed input, hence 200 
instead of 100 neurones); 2) a time-distributed layer that applies the following dense layer to every 
temporal slice of an input; and 3) the fully connected layer itself. The first number of trainable 
parameters in both models, 800970, is calculated via multiplication of the number of inputs (80096 
words in vocabulary + 1) and the number of outputs (100 units in the hidden layer). 
Figure 1. Topology of the sequential network 
(  
Figure 2. Topology of the BLSTM network 
(  
In compiling the models, we used a rectified linear unit (‘relu’) as an activation function for each 
hidden layer; this type of neurone propagates forward all positive inputs unchanged but returns 0s 
for all negative inputs (Hahnloser, Seung, & Slotine 2003). For the output layer, softmax activation 
was used; this function turns the scores from the last hidden layer into probabilities that sum up to 
1, thus allowing the model to classify each tweet as 0 (written by trolls) or 1 (written by 
congressmen). Categorical crossentropy was chosen as the loss function, and the stochastic gradient 
descent was optimised by an ‘adam’ algorithm (Kingma & Ba 2015). Each model was trained on 
168,000 samples and validated on 72,000 samples in 10 epochs. 
Table 1. Neural networks’ loss and accuracy scores (training and validation sets) 
The obtained scores for both models are given in Table 1. From the validation scores, it is clear that 
both models began overfitting from the second epoch: while the accuracy of the classifying tweets 
from the training set rose steadily, the accuracy of the classifying tweets from the validation moved 
in the opposite direction. This result was confirmed by testing both models on 60,000 tweets from 
the test set. 
Epochs Time
Training Validation
Loss Accuracy Loss Accuracy
Sequential 
network
1 354s 0.2498 0.8996 0.2302 0.9086
2 349s 0.1810 0.9262 0.2382 0.9098
3 403s 0.1388 0.9393 0.2704 0.9022
4 410s 0.0996 0.9504 0.3309 0.8925
5 426s 0.0708 0.9593 0.3916 0.8826
6 419s 0.0533 0.9659 0.4885 0.8803
7 424s 0.0429 0.9721 0.5647 0.8741
8 421s 0.0349 0.9754 0.6528 0.8679
9 422s 0.0295 0.9797 0.7479 0.8702
10 426s 0.0258 0.9828 0.8163 0.8659
BLSTM
1 1547s 0.2496 0.8996 0.2236 0.9118
2 1327s 0.1874 0.9262 0.2282 0.9067
3 1342s 0.1536 0.9393 0.2483 0.9076
4 905s 0.1254 0.9504 0.2643 0.9030
5 897s 0.1020 0.9593 0.3034 0.8981
6 894s 0.0837 0.9659 0.3691 0.8979
7 908s 0.0693 0.9721 0.4676 0.8940
8 890s 0.0593 0.9754 0.4738 0.8935
9 894s 0.0499 0.9797 0.4999 0.8952
10 896s 0.0420 0.9828 0.5775 0.8881
The overall results of classification are very satisfactory: such accuracy scores mean that 
out of 100 random new tweets, our neural networks can correctly classify 87 and 89 messages, 
respectively. In addition, we can see that, as expected, the BLTSM outperformed the sequential 
network, although in terms of computational costs, its work was much more expensive. 
Can these results be improved? To answer the question, we built another neural network 
that resembled our BLTSM model in all respects but one: instead of the random initialisation of 
weights in the network, we used pretrained Word2Vec embeddings, a very efficient and popular 
algorithm for representing words as continuous vectors comprising the probabilities of their co-
occurrences with every other single word in a given corpus (Mikolov et al. 2013). As Kocmi &. 
Bojar argue, ‘pretrained embeddings, as opposed to random initialisation, could work better because 
they already contain some information about word relations’ (2017).

We decided not to download and use ready-made ‘generic’ Word2Vec embeddings that are 
freely available on the internet  but rather build our own Word2Vec model with the aim of trying to 2
catch specific connections between the words in our collection of tweets. The hyperparameters of 
the model were as follows: the size of the context window equal to 3, the number of iterations equal 
to 5, the minimal occurrence threshold equal to 5. Importantly, the model was trained on the whole 
collection of 2,585,048 tweets, not only on the sample that was randomly selected for the neural 
network. 
After that, an embedding matrix was created. For all words in the tweets of our sample that 
had been vectorised by the Word2Vec model, the matrix was filled with respective vectors (hence 
there were 100 neurones in the network: the Word2Vec vectors that we used were 100-
dimensional). For the words that had not been vectorised, the matrix was filled with zeroes. 
Pretrained embeddings are sometimes used as a fixed mapping for a more robust topology 
(Kenter and De Rijke 2015); however, we preferred to leave them trainable as all other weights in 
the network. A new neural network was, again, trained, validated and tested. Its loss and accuracy 
scores are provided in Table 2 for ease of comparison alongside the already cited results of the two 
previous models. The improvement was highly significant. We have little doubt that with further 
fine-tuning of the network the results can improve even more; however, for now, we will leave it as 
it is.

Table 2. Loss and accuracy scores of models without pretrained embeddings and with them 
Russian trolls were engaged in swaying the U.S. elections in favour of Donald Trump, who himself 
is infamous for provocative tweeting. It is reasonable to expect that if our neural network can 
generalise very well, even across completely different samples, it would classify the majority of the 
POTUS tweets as being troll-like. To test this hypothesis, we downloaded and analysed 32,804 
tweets posted by Trump from 2009 to 2017. Those tweets were preprocessed in exactly the same 
way that trolls’ and the congressmen’s tweets had been, and after that, the whole sample was fed 
into our BLSTM neural network with pretrained embeddings for classification. 
Loss Accuracy
Sequential network 0.81 0.87
BLSTM 0.56 0.89
BLSTM with pretrained 
embeddings 0.33 0.91
 E.g., here: https://code.google.com/archive/p/word2vec/.2
The results were unsurprising: the model classified 22,055 tweets as troll-like and only 
10,749 as ‘genuine’. Therefore, we could conclude that each time Trump posts a tweet, there is a 
67 % probability that it would be something that a paid internet troll could have written. 
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However, what exactly does it mean to be troll-like from a linguistic perspective? We will 
try to answer this question in the following sections. 
What a neural network cannot predict 
It is notoriously difficult to determine what exactly occurs inside a neural network; however, it is of 
paramount importance to us to identify some of the characteristic traits of the tweets that our model 
has classified correctly and those for which it failed. Only by doing this can we hope to obtain some 
insight into what actually distinguishes troll writing from genuine writing on the language level. 
First, we divided our test_predictions_tweets data (60,000 tweets by both trolls and 
congressmen on which the model was tested) into right_tweets and wrong_tweets subsets—for the 
precisely and mistakenly classified tweets, respectively. Then, we made the dictionaries of all the 
lexemes in both subsets and calculated the number of words and lemmas as well as the type/token 
ratios. The results are provided in Table 3. 
Table 3. TTR of correctly and incorrectly classified tweets 
The surprising aspect is the TTR for the wrong_tweets subset: it is more than 3 times larger than the 
TTR of the right_tweets subset and the TTR of the whole sample. Since it is assumed that a high 
TTR indicates a high degree of lexical variation while a low TTR indicates the opposite (Templin 
1957), one could guess that the reason behind the problems that our neural network experienced 
with wrong_tweets is their higher degree of lexical diversity: there are many words that are used 
just a few times. 
Table 4. Ratios of unique and shared lemmas in correctly and incorrectly classified tweets 
To check this assumption, we calculated the number of the lemmas that are unique for the 
wrong_tweets subset, the right_tweets subset, and those that are used in both subsets. The picture 
(Table 4) is quite the opposite of what one would expect. While the right_tweets are characterised 
by the enormous ratio of lemmas that are used exclusively within this subset, the situation is 
Number of words Number of lemmas TTR (%)
right_tweets 646,092 33,908 5.24
wrong_tweets 48,135 9,522 19.78
test_predictions_tweets 694,227 35,362 5.09
Number of lemmas Unique lemmas Ratio (%) Shared lemmas Ratio (%)
right_tweets 33,908 25,840 76.20 8,068 23.79
wrong_tweets 9,522 1,454 15.26 8,068 84.73
 Unfortunately, Trump’s tweets were not chronologically arranged in the collection that we used. Given a large span of 3
covered time, it would be very interesting to compare the tweets posted before Trump began his election campaign and 
those posted after.
reversed for the wrong_tweets: almost 85 % of all their lemmas are those that are also encountered 
in another subset. 
Pearson’s Chi-squared test with Yates’ continuity correction lends credibility to these 
findings: X-squared = 3520.5, df = 1, p-value < 2.2e-16. As Figure 3 clearly illustrates, while the 
wrong_tweets exhibit greater lexical diversity, it is in the right_tweets subset where the unique 
lemmas are significantly overrepresented. 
Figure 3. Association plot of the representation of unique lemmas 
in correctly and incorrectly classified tweets 
  
Nonetheless, analysis of the unique lemmas distribution in the tweets of both subsets, the results of 
which are provided in Table 5, proves that those lemmas alone cannot account for the discrepancies 
in the text classification. More than 30 % of all right_tweets and more than 70 % of all 
wrong_tweets do not contain any unique lemmas at all. 
Table 5. Ratios of correctly and incorrectly classified tweets 
with unique and shared lemmas 
Number of tweets With shared lemmas Ratio (%) With unique lemmas Ratio (%)
right_tweets 54,650 54,441 99.61 35,922 65.73
wrong_tweets 5,350 5,347 99.94 1,143 21.36
Therefore, our next goal was to identify a list of variables and build a regression model that could 
predict which tweet in a given corpus has higher odds of being classified correctly by a neural 
network. 
In determining the variables, it makes sense to take into account only those parameters that 
could influence the neural network’s decisions, that is, only distributional information is relevant 
while all semantic and morphosyntactic variation may be excluded from consideration. The 
following list of variables was finally identified:

(1) mean pairwise cosine distance within tweet (cm), 
(2) standard deviation of cosine distances within tweet (csd); 
(3) range of cosine distances within tweet (cr); 
(4) mean word frequency (mf); 
(5) relative length of tweet (rl); 
(6) unique words ratio per tweet (uwr); 
(7) cross-tweet words representation (ctwr). 
The variables (1)—(3) are fairly much self-explanatory. To calculate the numbers, we used vector 
representations of the most frequent words of the tweets provided by our Word2Vec model. That 
required, first, building the vocabulary of the Word2Vec model, removing from the tweets for all the 
words that were not vectorised by the model and dividing the rest into all possible pairings so that 
for a tweet consisting of 14 words 
[‘past', ‘time', 'stop', 'turn', 'blind', 'eye', 'deaf ', 'ear', 'children', 'wait', 'bear', 'time', 'end', 'suffer'] 
we would obtain 90 pairs of words: 
[['past', ‘time'], ['past', 'stop'], ['past', 'turn'], ['past', 'blind'], ['past', 'eye'], ['past', 'deaf '], ['past', 'ear'], 
['past', 'children'], ['past', 'wait'], ['past', 'bear'], ['past', 'time'], ['past', 'end'], ['past', 'suffer'], ['time', 'stop'], 
['time', 'turn'], ['time', 'blind'], ['time', 'eye'], ['time', 'deaf '], ['time', 'ear'], ['time', 'children'], ['time', 
'wait'], ['time', 'bear'], ['time', 'end'], ['time', 'suffer'], ['stop', 'turn'], ['stop', 'blind'], ['stop', 'eye'], ['stop', 
'deaf '], ['stop', 'ear'], ['stop', 'children'], ['stop', 'wait'], ['stop', ‘bear'], ['stop', 'time'], ['stop', 'end'], ['stop', 
'suffer'], ['turn', 'blind'], ['turn', 'eye'], ['turn', 'deaf '], ['turn', 'ear'], ['turn', 'children'], ['turn', 'wait'], ['turn', 
'bear'], ['turn', 'time'], ['turn', 'end'], ['turn', 'suffer'], ['blind', 'eye'], ['blind', 'deaf '], ['blind', 'ear'], ['blind', 
'children'], ['blind', 'wait'], ['blind', ‘bear'], ['blind', 'time'], ['blind', 'end'], ['blind', 'suffer'], ['eye', 'deaf '], 
['eye', 'ear'], ['eye', 'children'], ['eye', 'wait'], ['eye', 'bear'], ['eye', 'time'], ['eye', 'end'], ['eye', 'suffer'], ['deaf ', 
'ear'], ['deaf ', ‘children'], ['deaf ', 'wait'], ['deaf ', 'bear'], ['deaf ', 'time'], ['deaf ', 'end'], ['deaf ', 'suffer'], ['ear', 
'children'], ['ear', 'wait'], ['ear', 'bear'], ['ear', 'time'], ['ear', 'end'], ['ear', 'suffer'], ['children', 'wait'], 
['children', 'bear'], ['children', 'time'], ['children', 'end'], ['children', 'suffer'], ['wait', 'bear'], ['wait', 'time'], 
['wait', 'end'], ['wait', 'suffer'], ['bear', 'time'], ['bear', 'end'], ['bear', 'suffer'], ['time', 'end'], ['time', 'suffer'], 
['end', 'suffer']] 
and, after measuring the cosine distances between the vector representations in each pair, the 
following 90 numbers: 
[0.23084405, 0.165006, 0.09426032, 0.018875737, 0.08728446, -0.035145633, -0.21513806, 0.15835008, 
0.39891496, 0.031234484, 0.23084405, 0.42888537, 0.15516211, 0.3253909, 0.23327011, -0.052872457, 
0.049503084, -0.10375977, -0.15152891, 0.2545478, 0.4174173, 0.014464399, 0.29235175, 0.13149995, 
0.31327742, 0.12590031, 0.0901772, -0.06048733, -0.048911296, 0.20062421, 0.22691028, -0.08247886, 
0.3253909, 0.6127991, 0.105595976, 0.3352162, 0.18447617, 0.12916106, 0.062038686, 0.15504947, 
0.3920124, 0.07559819, 0.23327011, 0.23965108, 0.18687809, 0.45571902, 0.43940967, 0.2538958, 
0.16856779, 0.13967085, 0.1353369, -0.052872457, 0.043003216, 0.14657624, 0.30956715, 0.3490589, 
0.16273755, 0.17156608, 0.104764484, 0.049503084, 0.039942108, 0.061188716, 0.461818, 0.14407241, 
0.057416767, 0.14238377, -0.10375977, -0.09211613, 0.11603537, -0.023796022, 0.03380314, 0.15804541, 
-0.15152891, -0.24166468, 0.031274837, 0.17082833, 0.16026187, 0.2545478, 0.26816827, 0.32470933, 
0.052134376, 0.4174173, 0.24416408, 0.22999296, 0.014464399, 0.046255637, 0.23251586, 0.29235175, 
0.13149995, 0.23462225] 
from which it follows that the most closely related words in our example are stop and end 
(0.6127991)  while the most distant ones are ear and end (-0.24166468). After that, we only had to 4
calculate the mean, standard deviation, and range for all cosine similarities. In our example, that 
makes [0.15050405], [0.16194732], and [0.37113443], respectively. 
Variable (4), mean word frequency, was constructed by replacing all the words in tweets 
with their respective frequencies in the whole sample and calculating the mean. The 
aforementioned tweet after this procedure turned into the following sequence of numbers: 
[315, 2432, 1186, 398, 42, 145, 11, 9, 866, 298, 215, 2432, 1038, 152], 
since the words past, time, stop, turn, blind, eye, deaf, ear, children, wait, bear, time (appear for the 
second time), end, and suffer are used throughout the sample the respective number of times. The 
mean word frequency for this tweet equals 681.35. 
Variable (5), the relative length of a tweet, gives the number of words within tweet 
divided by the mean length of all tweets in the sample. As the latter measure is 11.57, the relative 
length of our example with its 14 words will be equal to 1.20. 
Variable (6), the measure of the unique words ratio per tweet, is, in fact, another way of 
calculating the mean word frequency but additionally taking into account the distribution of the 
lemmas. The test_predictions_tweets sample was vectorised by turning each tweet into a sequence 
of integers (each integer being the index of a lemma in a dictionary). For each integer, the 
respective word count was obtained. 
If we consider the array of unique indices of all the lemmas in the sample (1) and the 
array of their respective frequencies (2), it will become clear that the lemmas are indexed not 
alphabetically or chronologically (in order of appearance) but with regard to their total number of 
counts: 
(1) [1,  2,  3, …, 47610,  47611,  47612] 
(2) [4766,               3501,  3318, ..., 1,  1,  1] 
so that the word with index 1 appears 4,766 times, the word with index 2—3,501 times, and the 
last words with indices from 47610 to 47612 are hapax legomena. The first 7 entries of the resulting 
word-index dictionary are given below, with the word Trump being, not surprisingly, number 1, 
an absolute leader: {‘trump': 1, 'today': 2, 'people': 3, 'woman': 4, 'work': 5, 'make': 6, 'American': 
7, …}. 
Thus, the unique words ratio was obtained by calculating the mean of indices of all words 
within a single tweet. It goes without saying that the greater this value, the more bottom-ranking 
words of the dictionary will be used in a tweet. In our example, it is 1415.64—which is quite 
different from the respective mean word frequency (681.35). 
Variable (7), the measure of cross-tweet words representation, is, perhaps, the most 
difficult to grasp. To avoid confusion, below, we will include the relevant fragment of our Python 
code and comment on it in more detail. 
(1) 
signal_lemmas_wrong = [lemma for lemma in test_tweets_lemmas \ 
                      if lemma in wrong_tweets_lemmas if lemma not in right_tweets_lemmas] 
signal_lemmas_right = [lemma for lemma in test_tweets_lemmas \ 
                      if lemma not in wrong_tweets_lemmas if lemma in right_tweets_lemmas] 
 Cosine measure returns similarities in the range <-1, 1> (the greater, the more similar).4
In step (1), we make two lists of lemmas that are used exclusively in right_tweets and wrong_tweets. 
(2) 
wrong_word_gradience = [] 
for tweet in wrong_tweets: 
    for word in tweet: 
        if word in signal_lemmas_both: 
            wrong_word_gradience.append(word) 
unique_wwg, counts_wwg = np.unique(wrong_word_gradience, return_counts=True) 
from scipy import stats 
counts_wwg = stats.zscore(counts_wwg) 
dictionary_wwg = dict(zip(unique_wwg, counts_wwg)) 
right_word_gradience = [] 
for tweet in right_tweets: 
    for word in tweet: 
        if word in signal_lemmas_both: 
            right_word_gradience.append(word) 
unique_rwg, counts_rwg = np.unique(right_word_gradience, return_counts=True) 
counts_rwg = stats.zscore(counts_rwg) 
dictionary_rwg = dict(zip(unique_rwg, counts_rwg)) 
dict_both = [dictionary_rwg, dictionary_wwg] 
dict_gradience = {} 
for k in dictionary_rwg.keys(): 
    dict_gradience[k] = tuple(dict_gradience[k] for dict_gradience in dict_both) 
keys_dict_gradience = list(dict_gradience.keys()) 
values_dict_gradience = list(dict_gradience.values()) 
signal_lemmas_right_extend = [] 
for i in range(len(values_dict_gradience)): 
    if values_dict_gradience[i][0] > values_dict_gradience[i][1]: 
        signal_lemmas_right_extend.append(keys_dict_gradience[i]) 
signal_lemmas_wrong_extend = [] 
for i in range(len(values_dict_gradience)): 
    if values_dict_gradience[i][0] < values_dict_gradience[i][1]: 
        signal_lemmas_wrong_extend.append(keys_dict_gradience[i]) 
In step (2), two supplementary lists are created: one of the lemmas that co-appear more often 
with lemmas used exclusively in wrong_tweets; another of the lemmas that co-appear more often 
with lemmas used exclusively in right_tweets. The obtained scores were normalised. The 
distribution of words in our example is given in Table 6. 
Table 6. Cross-tweet words representation measure exemplified by one tweet 
right_tweets wrong_tweets
past 1.12 0.92
time 10.85 12.21
stop 5.11 5.78
turn 1.43 2.28
It is evident that time and suffer are more strongly associated with unique lemmas of the 
wrong_tweets subset whereas children and end appear more frequently together with lemmas that 
are characteristic for right_tweets. 
(3) 
prob1 = [0 for i in test_predictions_tweets] 
prob2 = [0 for i in test_predictions_tweets]  
k = 0 
for i in test_predictions_tweets: 
    for j in i: 
        if j in signal_lemmas_right or j in signal_lemmas_wrong:  
            prob1[k] += 1.1 
            prob2[k] += 0.1 
        else: 
            if j in signal_lemmas_right_extend or j in signal_lemmas_wrong_extend: 
                prob1[k] += 0.5 
                prob2[k] += 0.1  
            else: 
                prob1[k] += 0.1 
                prob2[k] += 1.1 
    k += 1 
prob_reg = [prob1[i]/prob2[i] for i in range(len(test_predictions_tweets))] 
Most of the heavy lifting is done in step (3). To begin with, for each lemma in the sample two zero 
values are assigned: prob1 and prob2, which are numerical indications of the ‘biasedness’ and the 
‘unbiasedness’ of this word, respectively. The algorithm then takes each tweet in the sample and 
each word in the tweet, consecutively, and first checks whether the word belongs to the short or 
to the extended list of lemmas that are attracted to right_tweets or wrong_tweets. 
If yes, the prob1 of the word in question is enlarged by 1.1 (for core lemmas) or 0.5 (for 
associated lemmas) while the prob2 is enlarged by 0.1 for both types (to avoid zeroes in the array). 
If that is not the case, then the word’s prob1 is enlarged by 0.1 and its prob2 is enlarged by 1.1. 
Finally, the measure of cross-tweet words representation within a tweet is created by calculating 
the ratio of the sum of the prob1 values and the sum of the prob2 values for each tweet. 
blind -0.19 -0.24
eye 0.40 0.46
deaf — —
ear -0.33 -0.18
children 3.77 2.35
wait 0.99 1.44
bear 0.73 0.59
time 10.85 12.21
end 4.60 2.67
suffer 0.38 0.79
Returning to our example, we obtain for it prob1 = 7.6 (0.5 x 13 + 1.1 x 1) and prob2 = 1.4 
(0.1 x 14): all the words in this tweet belong to extended subsets; thus, they obtain prob1 = 0.5 
with the only exception of the word deaf, which appears only in right_tweets. This results in a 
prob_reg = 7.6/1.4 = 5.42. 
A summary of how the values of each variable should be interpreted can be found in 
Table 7. Finally, our categorical response variable (pr) includes 2 possible outcomes: 0 for the 
tweets that were misclassified and 1 for the tweets that were labelled correctly. 
Table 7. Interpretation of variables in regression analysis 
As right_tweets outnumber wrong_tweets by a huge margin (54,650 and 5,350 tweets, 
respectively), we randomly selected 4,000 tweets from each subset and merged them so that our 
data frame for regression analysis became perfectly balanced. 
To determine which of the 7 independent variables influence the outcome of the 
classification task the most, we fitted a binary logistic regression model to the data, with (cm) 
mean pairwise cosine distances, (csd) standard deviation of all cosine distances, (cr) range of 
cosine similarities, (mf ) mean word frequency, (rl) relative length of tweet, (uwr) unique words 
ratio, and (ctwr) cross-tweet words representation as main effects; no interactions were taken into 
account in this Model.1. Overall, Model.1 was highly significant: LR chi2(7)= 4024.4, p < 0.001 
and explained a reasonable amount of variance: pseudo-R2 = 0.36 (McFadden), 0.39 (Cox and 
Snell), 0.52 (Nagelkerke). 
We used the drop1() function in RStudio to remove each term from the model, one at a 
time, and test the changes in the model’s fit. The results showed that variables (cm), (csd), and 
(cr) failed to make any significant contribution and can be easily left out. That finding was 
confirmed by the stepwise backwards model selection based on Akaike’s information criterion 
(AIC) with the help of the step() function in RStudio (Venables & Ripley 2002). 
The Model.1 diagnostics with the help of the influencePlot() function in RStudio (R Core 
Team 2013) helped to identify 5 observations as outliers or overly influential data points. After 
removing those tweets, we fitted to the data Model.2, where we left only (mf ) mean word 
frequency, (rl) relative length of tweet, (uwr) unique words ratio, and (ctwr) cross-tweet words 
representation as the main effects, and we added all possible interactions between those variables.  
Comparing Model.1 and Model.2 with the help of the anova() function in RStudio 
proved that Model.2 is significantly better than Model.1: residual deviance decreased by 481.85 (p 
< 0.001) and AIC decreased from 7081.9 to 7079.2. 
Variable Interpretation: the greater a value…
mean pairwise cosine distance within tweet (cm) …the more often words of a tweet appear together in 
other tweets 
standard deviation of cosine distances within tweet (csd) …the more diverse are words of a tweet in terms of their 
cooccurrence 
range of cosine distances within tweet (cr) …the greater a distance between the most similar and 
most unnatural pairs of words in a tweet 
mean word frequency (mf) ...the more frequently words of a tweet are used in the 
whole corpus 
relative length of tweet (rl) …the more a tweet surpasses the average length in the 
whole corpus 
unique words ratio per tweet (uwr) …the more bottom-ranking words of the whole corpus’s 
vocabulary are used in a tweet 
cross-tweet words representation (ctwr) ...the more words with a limited distribution are used in a 
tweet
Stepwise backward model selection based on AIC suggested that only (mf*rl) mean word 
frequency by relative length of tweet interaction should be removed. However, given the nature of 
our variables, we would suggest that a strong multicollinearity exists in the model. Checking for 
variance inflation factors in Model.2 with the help of the vif() function in RStudio (Fox & 
Weisberg 2018) produced alarming results (Table 8). 
Table 8. Variance Inflation Factors in regression model (Model.2) 
According to a rule of thumb proposed by Levshina (2015: 160), all values greater than 10 should 
be regarded as highly linearly related. Having deleted the most highly inflated interactions 
(mf*ctwr), (rl*ctwr), and (uwr*ctwr), we fitted Model.3 to the data. Comparing Model.2 and 
Model.3 with the help of the anova() function in RStudio revealed that Model.3 had lost some 
explanatory power: residual deviance increased by 388.3 (p < 0.001). However, multicollinearity 
was greatly reduced, and goodness-of-fit statistics slightly improved: pseudo-R2 = 0.37 
(McFadden), 0.40 (Cox and Snell), 0.53 (Nagelkerke). Stepwise backward model selection based 
on AIC suggested that interaction (mf*uwr) should be deleted, which was done in Model.4. The 
residual difference increased by 0.97; however, that was not significant (p = 0.33). 
As the interaction (mf*rl) remained inflated (vif-score = 12.39), though significant, we 
built Model.5 without taking it into account. Using the anova() function in RStudio showed that 
the residual deviance in Model.5 slightly increased in comparison with Model.4 (21.64, p < 0.001). 
As the difference was marginal, we nevertheless preferred Model.5 to Model.4 because it 
completely solved the problem of multicollinearity, thus making the results more reliable. 
Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of correct tweet classification (Model.5) 
  
mf rl uwr ctwr mf*rl mf*uwr mf*ctwr rl*uwr rl*ctwr uwr*ctwr
VIF 464.84 781.19 74.49 34.35 13.77 9.63 477.88 35.58 918.01 51.18
In general, Model.5 did a fairly good job as proved by the regression results presented in Figure 4. 
The main effects and one interaction of the Model.5 are visualised in Figure 5. The model shows a 
strong negative effect of the mean word frequency and a strong positive effect of cross-tweet 
words representation; however, the interaction of relative length and unique word ratio is not as 
easy to interpret. The interacting variables no longer represent the global change in the 
classification results with every increase in them; rather, such a change when the interacting term 
is at its reference level, i.e., it is equal to 0 (Aiken & West 1991). 
Figure 5. Effect plot of Model.5 
  
Of course, given the way in which our variables are scaled, 0 is not a particularly meaningful value 
since it never actually appears in the data: there are no tweets consisting of 0 words or of words 
with index 0. The effects can therefore be made more interpretable by centring the variables 
around the mean because when the variables are centred, their reference level corresponds not to 
meaningless 0 but rather to a perfectly clear average value. 
Having done this with the help of the normalize() function in RStudio, we obtained the 
following results (Table 9). The log-likelihood ratio test statistic of Model.5 is 4095.4 with the p-
value < 0.0001. Thus, the null hypothesis that the deviance of the model does not differ from the 
deviance of a model without any predictors can be rejected. Of all the predictors, none failed to 
cross the threshold of statistical significance (p < 0.0001). 
Table 9. Coefficients of regression model (Model.5) 
Note: LR chi2(5) = 4095.4, p < 0.0001. Pseudo-R2 = 0.36 (McFadden), 0.40 (Cox and Snell), 0.53 (Nagelkerke). 
Significance codes: ***—p < 0.0001. 
Overall, we observe both positive and negative main effects that can be interpreted as follows: 
(1) the odds of the right versus wrong tweet classification become 0.67 times lower 
with every increase in mean word frequency, 
(2) the odds of the right versus wrong tweet classification become 1.51 times higher 
with every increase in relative length of tweet when the unique word ratio of the 
tweet is average, 
(3) the odds of the right versus wrong tweet classification become 0.04 times lower 
with every increase in unique word ratio when the relative length of the tweet is 
average, 
(4) the odds of right versus wrong tweet classification become 63.06 times higher with 
every increase in cross-tweet words representation, 
(5) as the unique words ratio increases, the odds of the right versus wrong tweet 
classification decrease with every increase in the relative length of the tweet. 
(Figure 6). 
Summing the above, the tweets that are more easily classified share the following characteristics: 
(1) include words that are not very frequent, 
(2) are longer than average and at the same time do not have very rare words, 
(3) contain more words with limited distribution than omnipresent words. 
Our last step was to test our regression model on new data. A total of 1,350 observations were 
randomly selected from the bulk of the right_tweets subset that was not used during the training 
and merged with the remaining 1,350 observations from the wrong_tweets subset. Model.5 was 
fitted to the new data with the help of the predict() function in RStudio. To compare the output 
with the initial class-labels, we replaced all values greater than 0.5 with 1 and all values smaller 
than 0.5 with 0, thus turning probabilities into categories. The results were evaluated against the 
levels of the response variable (pr). The accuracy of the prediction turned out to be 85.89 %, 
which is a fairly decent score showing that our regression model is not overfitted and generalises 
well. 
Next, we return to our neural network and analyse whether there is any difference in the 
classification of tweets written by trolls and by congressmen. The numbers are as follows: 
95 % CI for odds ratio
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper
Constant 0.38*** (0.03) 1.37 1.47 1.58
(mf ) mean word frequency -0.38*** (0.03) 0.63 0.67 0.72
(rl) relative length of tweet 0.41*** (0.03) 1.40 1.51 1.63
(uwr) unique words ratio -3.12*** (0.09) 0.03 0.04 0.05
(ctwr) cross-tweet words 
representation 4.14*** (0.11) 50.62 63.06 79.18
(rl*uwr) -0.39*** (0.05) 0.6 0.67 0.74
(1) among the right_tweets subset, there are 29,387 troll tweets (53.77 %) and 25,265 
tweets by congressmen (46.22 %); 
(2) among the wrong_tweets subset, there are 2,266 troll tweets (42.34 %) and 3,086 
tweets by congressmen (57.66 %). 
The results are highly significant, as proved by the Pearson’s Chi-squared test with Yates’ 
continuity correction: X-squared = 255.14, df = 1, p-value < 2.2e-16. 
Figure 7 shows that the trolls’ tweets are overrepresented in the right_tweets and 
underrepresented in the wrong_tweets and vice-versa for the congressmen’s tweets. We can 
conclude that there is something intrinsic in troll writing that makes it subject to better labelling 
(which is, of course, a welcome result), and, given the coefficients of Model.5 and our 
interpretation of them, we would argue that it is a skewed distribution of at least one or, more 
likely, several linguistic features. 
Figure 7. Mosaic plot of classification results 
for troll’s tweets and congressmen’s tweets 
  
What does being a paid internet troll mean in terms of sociolinguistic behaviour? In essence, it is 
an imitation game. A troll wants to achieve their goal without being identified as trying to achieve 
it. In other words, their language attitudes must be predefined and moulded by a combination of 
two factors: the first one is speaking with a purpose; the second one is trying to mask the purpose 
of speaking. The different specific weight of these factors and their orthogonal nature necessarily 
result in the skewed language distribution that we mention above. 
The brief summary of possible linguistic features that might be affected by this tendency 
is provided in Table 10. In this paper, we will briefly consider only two first interconnected 
features, specifically, the distribution of topics and the vocabulary associated with those topics. 
Table 10. Language features that may be anomalously distributed in troll’s tweets 
What does it mean to be troll-like: topic modelling 
For topic modelling, we used the implementation of a latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) algorithm 
(Blei et al. 2003) in the Gensim package, which is well-known for its efficiency in text classification 
tasks (Chen et al. 2016). We split our sample of 300,000 tweets into tweets written by trolls and by 
congressmen and trained multiple LDA models with the number of topics ranging from 3 to 25 for 
both of the subsets. Then, the CV coherence measure (Röder et al. 2015) was obtained for each 
topic, and the mean value of all topic coherence measures was calculated for each model. 
Table 11. CV coherence measures for troll’s and congressmen’s tweets 
Unmarked features Marked features
thematic monotony, recurrent 
topics
targeted topics random new topics
skewed vocabulary signal words random new words
impersonality, lack of empathy lack of personal pronouns and 
determiners
occasional personal pronouns and 
determiners 
repetitiveness the same ngrams occasional new ngrams
exaggeration no hedge markers, lots of quantifiers, 
superlatives
occasional hedge markers, 
comparatives
future-orientedness imperatives, deontic modality, real 
conditionals
epistemic modality, unreal conditionals
proper nouns abundant use of proper nouns little or no proper nouns at all
polarisation of attitudes strong language: damnation and 
appraisal
soft language: paraphrases and 
euphemisms 
hypertextuality, one-goal-
orientedness
lots of demonstratives, lack of 
conjunctions
occasional conjunctions
prefabs same constructions, same words same constructions, new words
Number of topics Trolls: coherence scores Congressmen: coherence scores
3 0.2638 0.3495
5 0.2991 0.3607
7 0.2788 0.4610
9 0.2859 0.4439
11 0.3147 0.4613
13 0.3472 0.4644
15 0.3335 0.4913
17 0.3503 0.5135
19 0.3338 0.4945
The results are provided in Table 11. Since the coherence score, which ranges from 0 to 1, is the 
average of the relative distances between words within a topic, and since all hyperparameters of 
our LDA models with the sole exception of the number of topics were the same, we would argue 
that lower coherence scores for topics in the troll tweets serve as evidence of their anomalous 
lexical distribution. This distribution, as we will show, is in itself a result of using different topics as 
simple proxies for getting through a very limited number of signals. 
First, it is illuminating to observe what the picture will look like if we suppose that all 
troll tweets are dedicated to just one single topic as are the tweets by congressmen. What words 
will the LDA models show to be most prominent for this mega topic in either case? 
The top 10 words for trolls are as follows: 
0.009*"trump" + 0.005*"get" + 0.005*"say" + 0.005*"new" + 0.005*"police" + 0.004*"man" + 0.003*"people" 
+ 0.003*"make" + 0.003*"go" + 0.003*"workout" 
Their counterparts for congressmen are as follows: 
0.007*"today" + 0.006*"work" + 0.005*"trump" + 0.005*"thank" + 0.005*"make" + 0.004*"people" + 
0.004*"need" + 0.004*"bill" + 0.004*"vote" + 0.004*"help" 
We can observe that the major difference is not in the fact that different words have the highest 
scores. That is what one would expect given the bizarreness of the whole procedure of one-topic-
for-all-tweets modelling. What one would not expect is that the distance in coherence scores 
between the most prominent and second most prominent words is 4 times larger in trolls’ tweets 
compared to congressmen’s tweets: 0.004 and 0.001, respectively. This finding means that the 
word Trump tends to be omnipresent in the tweets of trolls, showing up even in the contexts to 
which it does not naturally belong. 
Moreover, if we now obtain the coherence scores of our single topics for their respective 
corpora, we will obtain 0.3481 for trolls and 0.0729 for congressmen. While the latter value is as 
marginal as needed to reflect the sheer impossibility of brute-forcing thousands of tweets written 
by different persons over a considerable time span into just one topic, the former value, in fact, 
does not deviate much from the coherence scores of models with 5, 19, and even 25 topics trained 
on the same data. 
To confirm and visualise this trend, we plotted mean coherence scores obtained by LDA 
modelling for both trolls’ and congressmen’s tweets with a number of topics ranging from 1 to 50. 
The results (Figures 8 and 9, respectively) are quite remarkable. Thus, the only model where the 
trolls’ tweets surpass the congressmen’s tweets in terms of coherence measure is the model with 1 
topic. In addition, since this topic as a sequence of top words associated with it is completely 
unintelligible from a human perspective, we must conclude that the topic modelling of troll 
writing should take into account its three-level structure that it is very different from that of 
‘genuine’ speech (Figure 10). 
We think that troll writing as a linguistic phenomenon is characterised by the 
omnipresence of a target message (or a small cluster of such messages) underlying each and every 
concrete topic, however great their range may be. The exceptions to this rule are minor and 
irregular, motivated by the aforementioned urge to hide the true purpose of speaking. The target 
messages themselves are nothing more than arrays of several words, which we have called signal 
or target words that shift from one context to another. 
21 0.3292 0.4880
23 0.3190 0.4936
25 0.3248 0.4809
Figure 8. Dynamics of coherence scores with number of topics rising from 1 to 50in trolls’ tweets 
  
Figure 9. Dynamics of coherence scores with number of topics rising from 1 to 50 
in congressmen’s tweets 
  
Figure 10. Schema of the three-level structure of troll writing 
Another observation that supports this hypothesis is based on a comparison of the within-topic 
coherence scores of the first and second top words associated with a particular topic. To compare 
these values, we chose the LDA models with the highest overall coherence scores and obtained 
for each of their 17 topics the 10 most characteristic words. The results of subtracting the score of 
the second top word from the score of the first one for each topic are presented in Table 12; the 
standard deviation and mean are shown at the bottom of the table. Arrays of the top words are 
provided for the topics with the greatest distance value. 
Table 12. Distances in coherence measures between the 1st and 2nd top words for different topics 
Trolls Congressmen
Topics Top words Distance Top words Distance
1 0.008 0.002
2 0 0.002
3 0.003 0.012
4
0.046*"rt" + 0.026*"trump" + 
0.015*"anti" + 0.013*"russia" + 
0.010*"racist" + 0.010*"call" + 
0.010*"potus" + 0.008*"north" + 
0.008*"us" + 0.008*"say"
0.020 0.002
5 0.002 0.006
6 0.019 0.001
7 0.003
0.048*"tax" + 0.022*"job" + 
0.022*"cut" + 0.014*"workers" + 
0.012*"pay" + 0.012*"work" + 
0.012*"families" + 
0.011*"economy" + 
0.010*"americans" + 
0.010*"american"
0.026
8 0.004 0.005
The results show that, on average, in trolls’ tweets, the first top word is distinguished from all 
other words of this topic by a much greater coherence score than in the congressmen’s tweets. 
Even if we leave out the most prominent value of 0.055 in topic 14, the picture will not change in 
principle: the median values of the distances in the trolls’ and the congressmen’s tweets are 0.008 
and 0.005, respectively. 
What can be the reason behind this result? Suppose that one has to write a great number 
of messages using the word Trump in most of them. Of course, it is not possible to simply repeat 
the same tweet all the time because that will lead to the disclosure of the presence of a troll. 
Hence, it is necessary to put the target word in a variety of different contexts, including those 
where it may seem unusual for other speakers. This, in turn, has consequences for the signal 
word’s lexical compatibility: its distribution largely increases, its neighbours become more 
numerous, and the cooccurrence links between it and other words become unnaturally 
strengthened. 
As a CV coherence measure is nothing more than the cosine similarity between a target 
word represented by a vector of its normalised pointwise mutual information (Bouma 2009) with 
every other word in the top-N topic list, we can predict that the aforementioned distributional 
anomalies will be reflected in the vector space of the whole corpus. 
9 0.009 0.007
10
0.059*"police" + 0.037*"shoot" + 
0.020*"man" + 0.018*"arrest" + 
0.017*"suspect" + 0.017*"fire" + 
0.016*"crash" + 0.016*"dead" + 
0.015*"kill" + 0.014*"officer"
0.022 0.005
11 0.013 0.004
12 0.001 0.003
13 0.012
0.044*"make" + 0.019*"need" + 
0.017*"sure" + 0.016*"every" + 
0.015*"keep" + 0.014*"future" + 
0.013*"work" + 0.013*"protect" 
+ 0.012*"ensure" + 0.010*"safe"
0.025
14
0.083*"trump" + 0.028*"obama" + 
0.021*"president" + 0.021*"news" + 
0.016*"donald" + 0.013*"say" + 
0.011*"election" + 0.011*"get" + 
0.010*"house" + 0.009*"media"
0.055 0.005
15 0.007 0.004
16 0.005 0
17 0.011
0.049*"trump" + 
0.022*"president" + 
0.017*"administration" + 
0.010*"attack" + 0.007*"north" 
+ 0.006*"nuclear" + 0.006*"war" 
+ 0.006*"de" + 0.006*"call" + 
0.006*"korea"
0.027
SD: 0.011 
Mean: 0.012
SD: 0.008 
Mean: 0.008
Figure 11. Maximal cosine similarities in congressmen’s tweets (SD = 0.13) 
  
Figure 12. Maximal cosine similarities in trolls’ tweets (SD = 0.17) 
  
Figure 13. Minimal cosine similarities in congressmen’s tweets (SD = 0.12) 
  
Figure 14. Minimal cosine similarities in trolls’ tweets (SD = 0.16) 
  
To test this assumption, we trained a new Word2Vec model on our sample of 300,000 tweets of 
both trolls and congressmen. The hyperparameters of the model were as follows: the size of the 
context window equals to 3, the number of iterations equals to 5, the minimal occurrence 
threshold equals to 1. Thus, every word in the sample was analysed, not only the most frequent 
ones. Having built this model, we obtained the maximal and minimal cosine similarity values for 
each tweet and plotted the results (Figures 11–14, respectively). The pattern is, in essence, the 
same: the dispersion of cosine distances, both maximal and minimal, is greater in the trolls’ tweets 
than in the congressmen’s tweets. It suggests that our prediction was accurate. 
Two independent one-tailed t-tests with Welch’s correction were performed to compare 
the means of the maximal and minimal cosine distances in 2,000 randomly selected congressmen’s 
and trolls’ tweets. With maximal values, on average, the congressmen’s tweets produced 
significantly greater cosine similarities (M = 0.70, SE = 0.004) than the trolls’ tweets (M = 0.64, 
SE = 0.004), t(1903.2) = 8.0256, p < 0.0001. Conversely, with minimal values, the congressmen’s 
tweets are characterised by significantly lower cosine similarities (M = -0.10, SE = 0.003) than the 
trolls’ tweets (M = -0.03, SE = 0.005), t(1861.1) = -10.926, p < 0.0001. Respective bar plots of the 
sample means with 95 % confidence intervals are provided in Figures 15 and 16.  5
Figure 15. Box plots of maximal cosine distances in trolls’ and congressmen’s tweets with 95 % 
confidence intervals (word count threshold = 1)
  
 The same pattern, though with less pronounced difference between minimal cosine distances, holds if we take into 5
account only distribution of words that appear at least 5 times in the corpus: with maximal values, on average, the 
congressmen’s tweets produced significantly greater cosine similarities (M = 0.53, SE = 0.004) than the trolls’ tweets 
(M = 0.38, SE = 0.005), t(1972) = 21.243, p < 0.0001. Conversely, with minimal values, the congressmen’s tweets are 
characterised by significantly lower cosine similarities (M = -0.28, SE = 0.004) than the trolls’ tweets (M = -0.22, SE = 
0.004), t(1972) = -9.595, p < 0.0001.
Figure 16. Box plots of minimal cosine distances in trolls’ and congressmen’s tweets with 95 % 
confidence intervals (word count threshold = 1)
  
We think that such a distribution can only be explained by the fact that certain signal words, 
which are important for the true purpose of trolls’ tweets, are forced upon multiple contexts, thus 
distorting all cooccurrence measures in the corpus. 
Let us consider the situation with ‘genuine’ tweets, as we consider the congressmen’s 
tweets to be. High maximal and low minimal cosine similarity values mean that, on average, in 
each tweet there tends to be at least one pair of words that are frequently used together in the 
corpus and at least one pair of words that are rarely used together. In contrast, less extreme 
maximal and minimal cosine similarity values, which are observable in the trolls’ tweets, mean 
that, on average, all words of that tweet appear together throughout the corpus quite a number of 
times, although not always in the same combination. As J. R. Firth’s famous maxima goes, ‘[y]ou 
shall know a word by the company it keeps’ (Firth 1957: 11). Thus, between the words in the 
trolls’ tweets, there are no close friends nor bitter enemies: only good acquaintances. 
One important deduction that can be made from these results is that each troll’s tweet in 
terms of its words’ cooccurrence measures is likely to be more isomorphic to the whole corpus, 
i.e., to act as the corpus’s better representative than any ‘genuine’ tweet. That perfectly explains 
the anomalous one-topic-for-all LDA model’s coherence score that was mentioned above. 
Conclusion 
The current study yielded a number of important findings. We managed to build a neural network 
that achieved an accuracy score of 91 % in classifying troll and ‘genuine’ tweets. By means of 
regression analysis, we identified a number of features that make a tweet more susceptible to 
correct labelling and found that they are inherently present in trolls’ tweets as a special type of 
discourse. 
We hypothesised that those features are grounded in the sociolinguistic limitations of 
troll writing, which can be best described as a combination of two factors: speaking with a 
purpose and trying to mask the purpose of speaking. Next, we contended that the orthogonal 
nature of these factors must necessarily result in the skewed distribution of many different 
language parameters of trolls’ messages. Having chosen as an example distribution of the topics 
and vocabulary associated with those topics, we showed some very pronounced distributional 
anomalies, thus confirming our prediction. 
It is natural to assume that very similar anomalies will be identified on many other levels 
of trolls’ writing that for now were left beyond the scope of the study. Among them, we could 
name personal pronouns and demonstratives, different types of ngrams, hedge markers, 
quantifiers, superlatives, imperatives, deontic modals, real conditionals, conjunctions, and 
different types of constructions. 
We have no doubt that in the future, the task of identifying trolls’ internet messages will 
be solved, and such posts will be filtered out as easily and successfully as spam emails are today. 
The importance of this work for modern society can hardly be overestimated. 
Data sources: 
Collection of Russian Troll Tweets. Available online at <https://github.com/fivethirtyeight/
russian-troll-tweets/>. June 2019. 
Collection of Tweets of Congress. Available online at <https://github.com/alexlitel/
congresstweets/>. June 2019. 
Collection of Trump Tweets. Available online at <https://github.com/mkearney/trumptweets>. 
June 2019. 
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